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
## STAFFING THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE SOVIET UNION

CIA Contribution for Subcommittee on National  
Security Staffing and Operations to the Committee  
on Government Operations, United States Senate

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION  
AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF  
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEAN-  
ING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE  
18, USC, SECTION 793 AND 794, THE  
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH  
IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED  
PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW

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## Annex: STAFFING THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Introduction

The doors of the personnel office are not normally open to those who would apply for a job with the Committee of State Security (KGB) or the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (GRU). Instead, both the KGB and GRU search out persons with suitable training or experience. The selectee can refuse, but a notation will appear in his record to the effect that he once rejected a request that he cooperate with the Committee of State Security, and his future career may be jeopardized.

Another distinguishing feature of staffing procedures followed by the Soviet intelligence services is the importance of political reliability under the single party system of government. Well before a man (or woman) is offered the opportunity to work for the KGB or GRU, his social and political history has been thoroughly investigated. His parents, brothers or sisters or other close relatives must not have been arrested for criminal or anti-social conduct, and the candidate himself must not have a police record. On the positive side, the candidate must be a party member, a candidate for membership, or eligible for future membership by virtue of membership in the party's youth organization, Komsomol. In the GRU, almost all Jews have been eliminated from service, and no Jews and relatively few members of minority nationalities are accepted into the Military-Diplomatic Academy, which is the doorway to service in the GRU. The KGB also discriminates against persons of national minorities. Political reliability is the keynote for the CPSU puts little trust in Jews and persons of non-Russian descent.

In staffing the KGB and the GRU two factors predominate: selection from above, and the over-riding influence of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

State Security

The KGB is responsible for counterintelligence and security within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. and for intelligence collection, counterintelligence and the security of Soviet citizens abroad. Since 1954 it has had the status of a Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and its chairman has had ministerial rank. Established as the CHEKA some 45 years ago, the Soviet state security service has always been a key factor in preserving

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the power of the regime and its leaders and has played a significant role in developing and expanding the power of the Soviet Union abroad.

The Soviet state security organization employs possibly as many as 300,000 persons, including executive, professional, administrative, clerical, technical, and uniformed personnel such as border guards. Inasmuch as a variety of jobs relating to security and intelligence are involved, staffing requirements and procedures vary among the various KGB components.

The chairman of the KGB and presumably many other top level personnel are "political appointees" - i.e. Communist Party functionaries, administrators or trouble shooters, sometimes with limited or no professional experience in security or intelligence work. The present chairman and his predecessors are good illustrations of this. Both Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin (chairman from 1958 to 1961) and Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastnyy (1961 - ) were career Party functionaries as was Khrushchev - and doubtless were appointed to strengthen Party control over state security. Neither had experience in intelligence or security work, but both were known to Khrushchev through their Party work. While political control of the organization is achieved by Khrushchev through such appointees, professional competence is maintained through career personnel brought up through the ranks. One such individual is KGB First Deputy Petr Ivanovich Ivashutin, who has had a long career in state security work. A second deputy, Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn, served as Chairman of the Belorussian KGB for several years before assuming his present post, and Semen Nikiforovich Perevertkin, before his accidental death in 1961, had a long military career, probably with the security troops controlled by the KGB.

KGB personnel below the executive level may be divided roughly into four categories: operational, administrative, technical, and military. The organizational component responsible for employment processing and all future staffing arrangements is the Personnel Directorate. Its functions are considered important enough that it is among the few directorates supervised by the Chairman himself, rather than by a deputy chairman. This directorate is responsible for processing employees for all KGB components; 25X1C

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While personnel actions normally originate within the KGB and are processed through the Personnel Directorate, the Party must approve all such actions which affect senior personnel and may even initiate them. [REDACTED] all personnel actions involving deputy department chiefs and above fall in this category. Party approval is obtained from the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the department which supervises the intelligence, security, and judicial organs of the Soviet government. Additionally, transfer of personnel overseas must be approved by the Central Committee Department for Travel Abroad.

The selection of operational personnel for the KGB is made with exceptional care. Security checks are very thorough. Candidates for employment with the First Chief Directorate, at least, must be Party members or candidate members and must be vouched for by other Party members. Educational standards are not rigid but may vary with the position under consideration. Candidates may be spotted through any of several channels: recommendations of Party members or organizations; recommendations of KGB personnel; review of graduates of various institutes of higher education, notably the Military-Diplomatic Academy and Moscow University; possibly even levies on other governmental organizations.


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Administrative personnel of the KGB are presumably selected through established government-wide channels. The KGB Personnel Directorate presumably reviews lists of graduates of business institutes to spot clerical and administrative personnel. Interpreters may be obtained from schools specializing in languages.

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
Upon acceptance into the KGB, such personnel receive additional training.



Uniformed personnel of the KGB in the lower ranks are obtained through the annual military draft. Personnel for the Border Guards, at least, were selected from among inductees and obliged to serve a regular three-year tour in that service. Some officers may be transferred to the KGB from other military branches, but the KGB Chief Directorate of Border Guards has its own officer candidate schools for bringing officers up through the ranks. While there are a number of career personnel in the KGB uniformed forces, the bulk of enlisted personnel are draftees.

Because of its internal security function, the KGB assigns personnel to every significant office, institute, installation, or other point of security interest in the U.S.S.R. These security personnel are usually recognized as such, although their function is not publicized. Such assignments require some measure of contact between the KGB Personnel Directorate and a number of other government offices.

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As a rule, the wishes of the KGB may be expected to prevail when there is a conflict between it and some other organization

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relative to the assignment of KGB personnel for training or cover purposes. Abroad, the Soviet ambassador has no control over the selection of KGB personnel to serve in his embassy, and virtually no control over them once they have been assigned. Conflicts in the field can only be resolved in Moscow, and in such cases the KGB is usually overruled only for overriding political considerations.

While the state security service has frequently been the center of political machinations and consequently subject to arbitrary purges and reorganizations, Soviet policy since the rise of Khrushchev has been to raise its status in the eyes of the Soviet populace. As a consequence, the prestige of the service has risen and there is no doubt that morale has improved and pressures have somewhat relaxed. The state security service has traditionally received pay and privileges in excess of those of other government organizations. In 1952, however, the MGB (predecessor of the KGB) lost certain financial advantages when its special rank classification was abolished. There is also reason to believe that the KGB personnel, like those of the GRU, were deprived of their special linguistic and "secrecy" allowances. It is believed, however, that the KGB may have a more liberal retirement policy, and that a liberal promotion policy has kept it the best-paid organization of the Soviet government. Operational workers, at least, are also given awards and commendations, sometimes by the Chairman himself, for outstanding successes. Prestige and liberal pay combine to provide the greatest incentives for employment with state security.

In view of the influence of the state security organization and the material advantages it can offer, there appears no doubt that it is in an advantageous position to select personnel of its choosing. Once employed and trained, employees are not normally permitted to resign, so manpower turnover does not present a problem.

#### Military Intelligence

The Intelligence Directorate (RU) of the General Staff of the Red Army was organized in 1921 with the primary responsibility for the collection of military information, a responsibility which previously had been among those held by the civilian security service. General Ivan Karlovich Berzin organized the RU, and became its first director, a position which he retained until he disappeared in the purges of 1936-1938. Under Berzin, the RU was staffed with officers of the Red Army or Navy who had displayed exceptional abilities in their military careers. From the mid 1930's until 1953, political subservience to Stalin rather than demonstrated professional competence was the essential element for attaining and occupying a position of leadership


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within the military intelligence service (the Chief Intelligence Directorate - GRU - from 1942). Likewise, since Stalin's death, personnel changes in the top echelon of the GRU have been the result of factional political disputes among the leaders of the CPSU rather than indications of basic changes in intelligence policy. The staffing of the GRU is marked by two significant features: 1) the basic military character of the organization, which is one of the largest Chief Directorates of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense and which is staffed throughout with military officers, and 2) the influence of the Communist Party which exercises its control through elements within the Central Committee in such a manner that the GRU is utterly dependent on the CC for policy guidance and operational expenses (allegedly even the GRU chief cannot authorize an expenditure of more than \$2,000, any amount greater than that must be approved by the CC). Nevertheless, although the chief and his deputies are political appointees, it would be a mistake to ignore the fact that during at least the past ten years these positions have been filled by officers possessing unusual executive abilities and skill at applying these to the problems inherent in the special field of military intelligence. The CC has realistically taken cognizance of such skills and utilized them when they were combined with the absolute essential -- political reliability as interpreted by Khrushchev and his supporters. 25X1C



Positions below the level of deputy chief are filled by career officers who are elevated to such positions as area directorate chief from within the ranks of the GRU. They too must be politically acceptable as well as experienced in conducting intelligence operations.

In the early 1950's it became apparent that accepted collection techniques were fast becoming inadequate to the needs of modern warfare, but not until around 1960 did this realization begin to affect the staffing problem. The great need within the GRU today is for men with sound training in science and technology to collect, transmit and process intelligence. Modern weapons and techniques of warfare have already outstripped the capability of military intelligence to provide timely information on which to base the planning and conduct of missile strikes

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during war. Likewise, in the field of strategic intelligence, where the emphasis is on the collection of scientific information pertaining to a foreign country's national defense, intelligence officers already trained in science and technology are in great demand.

Of lesser priority than the acquisition of a cadre of scientists and technicians is the requirement for an increase in the number of qualified language instructors to train officers who are going to foreign countries under non-Soviet cover and documentation, posing as nationals of the target country or a third country rather than admitting their Soviet citizenship and sponsorship.

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Personnel in the GRU receive benefits of a material nature which exceed those of the general military officer, although in the past few years these benefits have been cut drastically in a series of economy moves. Basically, a GRU officer receives pay based on his military rank plus an additional sum based on the duty slot he occupies in the GRU. This duty slot or status pay amounts to almost as much as his military rank pay, in some cases. Furthermore, the GRU has made efforts to up-grade the slots so that promotions to higher military ranks can be justified, for promotion is based on the slot an officer occupies as well as the time he has in grade. In past years, prior to around 1958 and 1959, GRU officers received extra pay amounting to 10 percent of their military rank pay for each foreign language they could use and another extra sum for "secrecy pay" -- money given because the officers duties involved the handling or custodianship of classified documents. These extra emoluments have been abolished as was the extra pay for medals won under Stalin's regime.

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One inducement of a mixed nature is provided at the very start of an officer's career in the GRU, and this is the provision that an officer attending the MDA retains his previous military rank and pay. This makes it possible for a married officer to accept the invitation to attend school for three years with the knowledge that his standard of living will not be drastically reduced as it would if he were otherwise embarking on a new career at the bottom of the ladder. Coupled with this is the opportunity to live in Moscow for another three years and obtain a higher education, all of which add up to a very attractive package.

Officers in the GRU, however, are subjected to pressures which are not felt by non-intelligence military personnel. They carry a very heavy work and study load, having to keep up with their party meetings, military courses, perform duties of their cover position if abroad in addition to meeting the deadlines for fulfilling their assigned missions in the GRU. There is always pressure to produce -- to recruit a certain number of agents within a given time span or to obtain a certain kind of information. An officer returning to headquarters on home leave is faced with the unpleasant prospect of having to write a report of his accomplishments of the past two years abroad and having this report reviewed by his headquarters chiefs who discuss and criticize the accomplishments, or lack thereof, with the officer in person. Failure to recruit an assigned number of agents may result in an officer's recall from a plush post abroad after only a single tour of duty and does result in delaying his promotion if one is due. The fear of making a mistake probably hangs heavily over the heads of the more timid officers, for small mistakes will prevent a promotion while major mistakes can bring early retirement on a reduced pension or outright dismissal from the GRU and assignment to the troops, possibly at a lower rank.

In the main, the benefits of a career in the GRU outweigh the drawbacks for a courageous and ambitious officer. There is a certain degree of career security, [REDACTED] and there are tangible benefits which contribute to an officer's standard of living and place him above the ordinary military officer.

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